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Abstract
Smartness in smart cities is achieved by sensing phenomena of interest and
using them to make smart decisions. Since the decision makers may not own
all the necessary sensing infrastructures, crowdsourced sensing, can help col-
lect important information of the city in near real-time. However, involving
people brings of the risk of exposing their private information.This chapter
explores crowdsensing in smart city applications and its privacy implications.
Keywords: Privacy, Crowdsensing, Smart Cities
1. Introduction
Smart cities are intelligent cities. Smartness of economy, people, gover-
nance, mobility, environment and living are the defining characteristics of
smart cities [1]. Intelligence in a smart city is built upon measuring phenom-
ena or things of interest and using them for making smart decisions. Mea-
suring things using sensors has been considered as the key aspect of a smart
city [2]. Today, sensors can measure a wide variety of phenomena. More-
over, since the size of these sensors has become smaller, they have now been
embedded in many household and personal devices including but not limited
to smartphones, vehicles, televisions and gaming devices. These sensors can
be used collectively for community based crowdsourcing of the collection of
measurements, a.k.a.mobile crowdsensing [3]. Since crowdsensing involves
people and their private devices, privacy and security are the prima facia
concerns. Although the term mobile crowdsensing and crowdsensing are of-
ten used interchangeably, in our opinion the term mobile crowdsensing covers
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only a subset of the more broader term crowdsensing. In this chapter, firstly,
we will attempt to define crowdsensing as a broader term for crowdsourced
sensing. Secondly, we will discuss privacy issues, concerns and considerations
in crowdsensing applications. Thirdly, we will present two case studies to il-
lustrate privacy issues in smart city crowdsensing and approaches to address
those issues. Finally, we will discuss and draw conclusions.
2. Defining crowdsensing
In this section we will discuss about different terminologies used in sensing
domain leading to a generalised definition of crowdsensing.
2.1. Sensing
The Webster online dictionary defines sensing as becoming aware of some-
thing via the senses1. This is a generic definition. Note that this definition
does not differentiate among different types of senses. Indeed, sensing can
be performed by not only the sensory organs of humans or animals but also
different types of sensors including electronic sensors.
In the computer science community, the W3C SSN ontology [4] defines
sensing as a process that provides an estimated value of a phenomenon. This
definition shows the realisation that measuring a phenomena often involves
measurement errors. Therefore a measurement value should be treated as
an estimation rather than an absolute value. Again, this definition does not
differentiate whether the sensing is performed by an electronic device or a
non-electronic object including human.
2.2. Sensors and Sensing
The W3C SSN ontology [4] also defines sensors as things that perform
sensing by transforming an incoming stimulus into digital representation.
Low cost of electronic sensors has made them the technology of choice for
estimating the value of a phenomenon. These sensors are already used in
modern cities for various purposes. For example, sensors are used to mea-
sure weather conditions such as temperature, relative humidity and wind
direction/velocity. These measurements are used to forecast the fire danger
ratings of bushfires in Australia [5], as well as, to assess and plan for the
fire-fighting activities during bushfires as discussed later in Section 4.
1http://www.webster-dictionary.org/definition/sensing
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Smartphones have become ubiquitous in our everyday lives. The sensors
embedded in smartphones can also observe several phenomena. In addition
to the sensors in smartphones, people are now at the forefront of sensing and
transforming the observations into electronic data. In other words, people are
working as social sensors [6]. These observations gathered from social sensors
can be used to generate different intelligence. For instance, people often use
social media platform like twitter to publish disaster related observations.
Such data has already been used for early detection of disasters [7], as well
as, for the situation awareness during disaster events [8].
Arguably, human can sense many phenomena for which sensors might be
either unavailable or available at a very high cost. For example, people can
assess non-physical phenomena such as feeling, mood, taste and smell. Fur-
thermore, for some phenomena, the same sensor reading might have different
meanings for different people. For example, the same temperature could be
considered as a comfortable temperature to some people while not so com-
fortable to others. Therefore, it is important to consider both electronic as
well as non-electronic sensing when developing application for smart cities.
2.3. Crowdsensing in Smart Cities
In case of a smart city, sensing is not limited to a single phenomena.
Rather, it has to cover different phenomena at different locations across the
city. Owning the infrastructure to collect measurements about these phenom-
ena may at times be very expensive and at other times almost impossible.
Therefore, community based crowdsourced sensing, or crowdsensing in short,
can play an important role in collecting information in smart cities.
We noticed that the terms crowdsensing and mobile crowdsensing have
often been used interchangeably and we disagree with such uses for the rea-
sons described below. The specialized term mobile crowdsensing was coined
by Ganti et al. [3] to refer to the crowd based sensing using electronic sensors
embedded in personal mobile devices. Guo et al. [9] extended this concept of
mobile crowdsensing to Mobile Crowd Sensing and Computing (MCSC). For-
mally, MCSC is defined as “a new sensing paradigm that empowers ordinary
citizens to contribute data sensed or generated from their mobile devices and
aggregates and fuses the data in the cloud for crowd intelligence extraction
and human-centric service delivery”. This definition includes data sensed by
sensors as well as that contributed by users through mobile devices. Even
though the definition of MCSC tries to broaden the notion of mobile crowd-
sensing, using this definition as a definition of a broader term crowdsensing
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is still not appropriate for the following reasons.
First, mobility is a major component of the mobile crowdsensing and the
MCSC definitions. However, in many cases, personal sensing devices might
not be mobile at all. For example, homes are often installed with security
camera devices at fixed locations that have already been used to sense crim-
inal activities in modern cities. Similarly, many homes in modern cities have
been installed with solar panels for electricity generation that are capable
of monitoring the generation and use of electricity in these homes. These
devices are not mobile, yet this information about electricity generation and
use combined with weather forecast could be used to predict the electricity
demand of a smart city. We have previously studied the use of locally in-
stalled weather stations in farms for welfare assessment of the animals in the
farms [10]. Similar to farms, people in smart cities could install their own
mini weather stations at their backyards to collect and share more precise
weather condition data around their homes. In all the above scenarios, sen-
sors are not attached to any mobile devices. They are not mobile either. Yet,
they contribute to the intelligence of a smart city.
And second, electronic sensors are the primary components of the above
definition of mobile crowdsensing. However, many of the phenomena of in-
terest need subjective assessment by human. For example, people constantly
sense their environment (e.g.confort, happiness) and share the information in
social media such as facebook and twitter using mobile and non-mobile de-
vices. In a city, people might identify peculiar smell around certain location,
or peculiar taste of water at their homes. The would notify to authorities
and might also post messages in social media about these issues. Crowd
based sensing mechanisms are already embedded in modern cities as a key
component of the post market surveillance of medicine for discovery of their
side-effects [11]. In all these examples, the information can be useful to au-
thorities to identify problems, develop an appropriate solutions quickly and
potentially save lives. These non-mobile data sensed and shared by the crowd,
not necessarily using mobile phones, would not be considered as crowdsensed
data if judged by the narrow definition of mobile sensing. Therefore, a more
general definition is required.
2.4. Defining crowdsensing
We define crowdsensing as an inverse form of crowdsourcing [12] in which
a vast number of independently owned entities (a.k.a. crowd including but not
limited to people) knowingly (e.g.participatory) or unknowingly (e.g.opportunistically)
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as well as directly (e.g.by typing) or indirectly (e.g.through computer/mobile
applications) sense and share the estimation of a phenomena that can be op-
portunistically used for decision making. Unlike in crowdsourcing, the crowd
is not asked to contribute data to solve a given problem. Rather, the crowd
senses and shares data which is used opportunistically to make evidence
based, and hence smart, decisions. Internet of things (IoT), specialized ap-
plications including prediction applications, mobile phone apps and Internet
based applications as well as generic social media applications can be con-
sidered as the enablers of crowdsensing. Considering this broader definition
and enablers of crowdsensing is more useful when developing a smart city
application as discussed in later sections.
3. Privacy in Crowdsensing
Privacy is a fundamental human need. As highlighted by O’Hara [13],
a person may feel comfortable to know that some information about it are
known to friends, others to its banker and yet others to its doctor. However,
the person may not feel comfortable if either of the three know all the facts
about it. This is because the collection of information about an individual al-
lows extraction of knowledge about the individual’s habits, beliefs and health
and therefore may create unfair disadvantage to the individual [14, 15, 16].
Furthermore, knowledge of personal facts may lead to inflicting personal
harm as well as illegal activities such as identity theft, blackmailing and
burglaries against the person. Therefore, considering privacy, specifically in
crowdsensing applications, is very important [17].
According to Martinez-Balleste et al. [18], there are five types of citi-
zen’s privacy: Identity Privacy, Query Privacy, Location Privacy, Footprint
Privacy, and, Owner Privacy. The identity privacy describes the problem
that users can be identified when they communicate with smart city com-
ponents. For example, an application installed in a smart phone could not
only contribute to crowdsensing but also share the personal information. The
identity privacy is not limited to the identify of the individual contributing
to crowdsensing. Sometimes, the information contributed by a person may
contain the private details of other people. For example, a non-social media
user can be profiled using information shared about the person from other
users [19]. Similarly, multimedia data may contain images of other people
revealing their privacy [20]. The query privacy relates to the queries asked
by users. By analysing the query, the user could be identified [21]. The
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location privacy covers the information about the position of users at give
times. Devices like modern mobile phones can gather GPS-based position
information like longitude and latitude revealing spatio-temporal preferences
of their users. Someone querying for a location-based service, e.g. a nearby
restaurant, can exposes its location. From location data and timestamps,
a person’s demographic information, home and work addresses, commute
routes and other habits can be derived [22, 23, 24] The footprint privacy is
about the risks involved with the combination of little pieces of information
that are left in a system. For example, when using a web browser to access
a web page, the cookie left on a device is a footprint of the web page that
can reveal individual’s preferences. Finally, the owner privacy addresses the
problem of querying data about the owner of the data contributed by a user.
For example, the citizen may contribute to the electricity use of their home
which could be used to infer potentially business sensitive information about
the electricity providers.
The Aadhaar case study presented in Section 5 will illustrate how a system
that can potentially bring smartness in an entire country may inflict some
of the above mentioned privacy issues. Legal instruments are necessary to
protect citizen privacy as well as to deter any misuse of people’s private data.
3.1. Privacy Laws in Australia
In Australia, the Privacy Act 19882 regulates handling of personal infor-
mation about individuals. It defines personal information as the “informa-
tion or an opinion, whether true or not, and whether recorded in a material
form or not, about an identified individual, or an individual who is reasonably
identifiable”. Accordingly to this definition, privacy is not only related to in-
dividuals personal information such as name, date of birth, address etc.but
also related to any commentary or opinion about the person. The Privacy
Act includes 13 Australian Privacy Principles (APP)3 which are applicable to
APP entities including most Australian government agencies and businesses.
In addition, the Australian Information Commissioner can make or approve
legally binding and non-binding guidelines and rules.
Modern technologies make the collection and storage of data, the extrac-
tion of information and the discovery of knowledge fast. On one hand, it
2https://www.legislation.gov.au/Series/C2004A03712
3https://www.oaic.gov.au/individuals/privacy-fact-sheets/general/privacy-fact-sheet-
17-australian-privacy-principles
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makes new applications like smart cities feasible. But on the other hand, it
can lead to erosion of privacy of the individuals [25]. Specifically in case of
crowdsensing applications, the private information about an individual could
be collected or inferred leading to personal, social and legal consequences.
Therefore, smart cities must consider the privacy related obligations and
implications of their applications.
3.2. Privacy obligations
Using crowdsourced data carries risk of illegally accessing, storing, sharing
and potentially revealing private or confidential information about people. If
not considered carefully, the information that should be protected may get
released to public not only causing damage to reputation but also leading
to legal infringements. Following are some privacy related obligations for an
entity collecting crowdsensed data.
Security of personal information. An entity holding personal information is
required to take all reasonable steps to protect the information from misuse,
interference and loss, as well as from unauthorised access, modification and
disclosure. The technologies related to privacy and security improve over
time. As such, the steps taken in the past as reasonable measures may not
be reasonable in today’s context. Therefore, APP entities should regularly
assess their approaches in regards to the security of personal information.
Compliance implications. An APP entity is required to take reasonable steps
in terms of implementation practices, procedures and systems to ensure the
compliance with APP. For the reasons similar to above, the APP entities
should regularly assess their privacy compliance practices and procedures.
Privacy policy. The APP privacy policy states that an APP entity must
clearly express and keep its privacy policy about the management of per-
sonal information up-to-date. As such, the privacy policy might need to be
reviewed to include the provision of usage, storage, sharing and publication
of crowdsensed data in the policy.
Use or disclosure. An APP entity may collect personal information about
an individual for a specific purpose. Such information must not be used or
disclosed for a different purpose without individuals consent. In case of excep-
tional circumstances outlined in APP, the APP entity must take reasonable
steps to ensure that the information is de-identified before disclosure.
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Smart cities need to collect data from a plethora of sensors, transport the
data over the network to servers in the cloud for storage and processing, and
use the data to make decision about the city’s infrastructure and services in
a smarter way. Although the use of crowdsensed data may not be an issue
when developing smart city applications, this system involves several risks
for the city and their citizens.
3.3. Privacy and security risks
Due to involvement of personal information, crowdsensing can inflict three
types of risks: (1) risk to crowdsensing participant devices, (2) risk to the
owners of the devices, and, (3) risk to the crowdsensing data and processing
servers. Firstly, the participating devices bear security risks as these devices
could be attacked to enable leakage of sensitive information. For example,
Ronen et al. [26] identified security vulnerabilities of the Philips Hue Smart
Light Bulb that could be used to attack these devices. In addition, the crowd-
sensing network could be spoofed to collect personal information. Secondly,
the risk may not be limited to devices. It could be extended to the owners
of the devices. Malicious or semi-honest entities in a crowdsensing appli-
cation could access personal information and use the information to cause
harm to the user [27, 28]. For example, the surveillance systems installed
at homes could be used to spy on others or the owner itself [29]. Similarly,
crowdsensing applications are vulnerable to the Sybil attack [30] leading to
harmful activities against individuals. Finally, the smart city application
server infrastructure bears the risk of being attacked as it contains a lot of
data about citizens. Hence, storage and publication of data, both directly or
accidentally, can have several privacy related implications.
3.4. Privacy implications
Following are some privacy related implications associated with collection
and release of data from smart city servers.
Privacy infringement. A business may collect and hold personal information
about private citizens when serving them using a crowdsensing based smart
city application. As an APP entity, the business is legally obliged to uphold
the privacy law and protect the information. Publication of data publicly
poses the risk of releasing private information if not considered carefully.
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Publication of data against law. Publication of data is sometimes prohibited
by law due to its sensitivity, or when it infringes someones rights or freedoms.
For example, publishing the detailed map of a military site might be prohib-
ited by law. Yet, when Strava published the heatmap of the fitbit users4, it
could be used to identify sensitive military locations and their supply routes5
publication of which could be deemed against the law.
Trade secret protection infringement. In today’s globalisation era, businesses
closely interact with each other sharing necessary information with each
other. As such, a business entity may hold information that is sensitive
to its business partners and might be considered as trade secrets. For exam-
ple, a business might use IoT devices to monitor and manage operations of
another business. If used in crowdsensing application, this data could expose
trade secrets of the business involved.
Mosaic effect. Anonymisation is one of the approaches used in privacy pro-
tected sharing of data. Even when the data are anonymised and released
publicly, the de-identified data could be combined with other datasets to
infer the identify of individuals. This approach of inferring information by
using data from multiple sources, also known as mosaic effect, is of a par-
ticular concern. Even after removing personal data before publishing, data
from locations with small populations may still reveal individual identities
by implication. For example, O’Hara [13] explained how anonymisation of a
subset of data by Google Street View led to identification of the believes and
opinions of anonymised entities and made them the subjects of vandalism6.
3.5. Privacy protection mechanisms in crowdsensing
Crowdsensing applications usually have access to either direct personal
information or spatio-temporal data that can be used to indirectly infer the
personal information. Several privacy protection mechanisms have been pro-
posed focusing on both direct and indirect access to personal information as
elaborated next. In crowdsensing applications, a single mechanism might not
be enough to ensure protection of private information of the participants. A
4https://labs.strava.com/heatmap/
5http://www.abc.net.au/news/science/2018-01-29/strava-heat-map-shows-military-
bases-and-supply-routes/9369490
6http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-11827862
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combination of these mechanisms can be useful [31] as also discussed in the
case studies provided in later sections.
Avoidance. The best way to protect people’s private information is not to
collect or store it at the first place. For example, as discussed in Section 5, if a
business needs to authenticate an individual using a third party application,
then neither the business nor the third party application should store the
information related to the individual’s authentication.
Cryptography. Cryptography techniques are used to ensure secrecy and in-
tegrity of data in the presence of an adversary. Based on the security needs
and the threats involved, various cryptographic methods such as symmetric
key cryptography or public key cryptography can be used during transporta-
tion and storage of the data. In addition, a homomorphic encryption allows
various computations to take place on encrypted data without requiring the
data to be decrypted for processing. From the privacy perspective, these
techniques are useful to protect personal information from being leaked dur-
ing transportation and from storage servers [31].
Anonymity and Pseudonyms. When contributing to crowdsensing, the user’s
identity and location need to be protected. Anonymisation of users or us-
ing pseudonyms can help achieve the protection. Specifically, the data at-
tributes that are related to user identification can be removed to achieve
anonymity. Similarly, to hide the real identity of users from the cloud in-
frastructure, trusted third party based pseudonymisers can be used to map
the users to pseudonyms [18] as well as to separate the location from the
data [24]. Furthermore, methods such as spatial cloaking e.g. by using k-
anonymity improve anonymity by grouping users of relative proximity to
each other or by replacing their position with the location of a close point of
interest thus a cohort of users share the same location information [32, 24].
Finally, data aggregation approaches are used in crowdsensing application
to provide summarised data instead of the raw data (e.g.monitoring traffic),
thereby removing identifiable information from the data [33, 34, 35].
Data obfuscation. Even when the private information of an individual is re-
moved, accurate values of the remaining attributes of the record could still
be used to identify the individual [36]. Data obfuscation can help achieve the
user’s privacy by transforming private data, e.g.time or location, in such a
way that the adversary cannot infer this data from other data [36, 32, 37]. For
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example, a numerical data could be transformed by applying a linear func-
tion on the original data to obtain a perturbed data. Similarly, the original
data of a record could be swapped among all the other records to create ob-
fuscation. In another approach, random noise could be added to the original
data to obtain perturbed data. Differential privacy is a obfuscation method
in which a randomised function is applied to the original dataset such that
the removal of a single record does not significantly alter the likelihood of an
output [38]. It helps protecting privacy of records in a database by adding
some randomness to the data [23, 39, 33, 40].
Access control mechanisms. In some crowdsensing applications, the private
data about the citizen could be collected and stored for legit reasons, e.g.counter
terrorism, or providing efficient services to citizen [41]. Even when the data
is encrypted before storing, the data could still be accessible to all the indi-
viduals who have access to the storage systems. This opens the possibility of
insider attack as discussed in section 5. Protecting privacy in such cases re-
quires a proper information flow models such as Bell-LaPadula model [42, 43],
Lattice model [44] and Readers-Writers Flow Model (RWFM) [45] to protect
the user’s information.
4. Case Study: Privacy in Crowdsensing for Disaster Management
A disaster can come in many forms causing loss of lives and severely
affecting the economy [46]. The United Nations International Strategy for
Disaster Reduction (UN/ISDR) [47] defines disaster as a serious disruption of
the functioning of a community or a society, at any scale, frequency or onset,
due to hazardous events leading to impacting human, material, economic and
environmental losses. The source of disaster can be natural, anthropogenic or
both. Natural disasters are associated with natural processes and phenomena
such as hurricane, tsunami and earthquake, while anthropogenic disasters are
predominantly induced by human activities, e.g.civil wars.
According to the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) figures [48], a
total of 346 natural disaster events occurred globally in 2015 alone. These
events caused 22,773 casualties leaving 98.6 million people affected. The
economic cost of these events was a massive US$66.5 billion. Therefore,
considering disaster management as a part of developing smart cities is very
important.
Information is crucial before, during and after the event of a disaster. In-
formation and communication technologies (ICTs) have already been used to
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Figure 1: A system architecture for disaster management
support the disaster risk management activities [49]. For example, computer
modelling are used to forecast natural disaster warning such as the probabil-
ity of the occurrence of flood and fire, and the path of a hurricane. During
the disaster event, timely acquisition and processing of data and extraction
of accurate information plays a crucial role in providing situation awareness
that helps carry on an appropriate disaster response. Since the people who
are in the disaster area including those affected by the disaster accurately
know the situation on the ground, they can be the primary source of data.
As such, crowdsensing the situation awareness during disaster is a perfectly
sensible approach.
We developed a prototype of the situation awareness system using the
crowdsensed data from sensors, specialised applications including mobile/web
applications, and social media. Figure 1 demonstrates different crowdsensors
required to assess and manage the situation in a natural disaster situation. In
order to understand our approach of crowdsensing in disaster management,
let’s first consider a disaster scenario.
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4.1. A motivating disaster scenario
In Australia, the Crisis Coordination Centre (CCC) is responsible for
large-scale disaster management. The CCC is a round-the-clock all-hazards
management facility that provides security, counter terrorism, and the mon-
itoring and reporting of natural disasters and other emergencies. The CCC
has policies and procedures in place for the actions to be undertaken during
disaster events. Part of its remit is the analysis of data from multiple sources,
aka data fusion, to understand the scope and the impact of a disaster event.
Imagine that the weather forecast in a certain area predicts heavy rainfall
which can possibly cause flooding in the area. After receiving information
from Bureau of Meteorology, an Australian government agency responsible
for monitoring weather, climate and water7, the CCC creates a transient so-
cial network to provide targeted information to the people in the area. Tel-
stra, a telecommunication provider, provides a list of landline phone numbers
installed in the area. Similarly, all the mobile service providers provide a list
of mobile phones that are roaming around in the area. This information is
used to contact people in the area and encourage them to use mobile app,
register their phones to receive emergency situation information and enable
ad-hoc networking when necessary. Besides the mobile app, hotlines and
SMS services are provided for people to contact emergency services. John
has followed the instructions and is emergency ready.
As expected, severe flooding has just occurred. John and other people are
now providing information to CCC about the situation around them. John
is diabetic and has just fainted. The app installed in John’s phone is sending
alert to his doctor about his deteriorating blood sugar levels. The doctor has
informed the authorities, who are now on their way to help him. People are in
touch with their families and friends using social media such as Twitter and
Facebook providing information about their situation. The flood has also
caused electricity outage in some areas while the telecommunication network
is affected in another area. Being connected to transient network over ad-hoc
network of mobile phones, people in those outage areas are still connected
to the rest of the world. Finally, sensors that are monitoring weather, water
quality, air quality etc.are providing crucial information that can affect the
health and well-being of people living in the area.
At CCC, data is being processed to gather intelligence about the ground
7http://www.bom.gov.au/
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situation.The data is coming from sensors installed in various locations; pic-
tures about the situations that are posted in social media; and the needs at
different locations that are posted in CCC application by the ground volun-
teers. The information is helping them to make crucial decisions.
4.2. Crowdsensing in disasters
In the above scenario, CCC is a specialised entity whose goal is to mitigate
the effect of a disaster. It needs to sense the situation awareness as the
phenomena of interest. CCC does not own any infrastructure in the disaster
zone. Therefore, it needs to sense the situation awareness from sources that
are owned typically by other entities including but not limited to general
public. Hence, it is an exemplary use case of crowdsensing.
Crowdsensing the situation awareness can be achieved by using three
types of data sources: 1.sensors, 2.specialised applications, and, 3.social net-
works. In the above disaster scenario, rain precipitation sensor installed at
BOM weather stations as well as at homes of individuals can provide informa-
tion about the amount of precipitation. BOM also uses the data to forecast
weather pattern of coming days and generate warnings. These information
can be used to predict the level of flood in an area and plan for disaster
mitigation and recovery. People can use specialised applications such as the
triple zero app8 to alert emergency services about the emergency needs. Use
of SMS in emergency situation is common in many countries. Similarly social
networks can sometimes be turned into specialised applications in disaster
situations. For example, Facebook can be converted to a crisis response app
in case of emergencies9. Similarly, Twitter can be used to detect a disaster
as well as assess ground level information about the situation10. In all the
above examples, the situation awareness is opportunistically sensed by using
data generated by several independent entities.
In situations arising out of disaster management, unstable, unreliable ad
hoc channels could become the only means of communication and information
gathering. The characteristics of such communication can be listed as follows:
• The nature of the disaster related communication, in the context of
smart city, is information gathering.
8http://emergencyapp.triplezero.gov.au/
9https://www.facebook.com/about/crisisresponse/
10https://esa.csiro.au/
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• Information on the ground zero is generated either through crowd sens-
ing such as real-time twitter, or submission of information by mobile
digital volunteers to a crowdsourcing platform.
• Mostly the information flow is carried out through wireless networks
which provide unstable, intermittent connectivity and through open
public networks.
• The other major sources of information are wireless sensor and actuator
installations specially established for detecting events such as mudslide,
flood, storm, fire, volcanic or seismic activities.
Thus the network paths have to overcome a whole range of network in-
teroperability and connectivity issues. In disaster situation, we specifically
explored the uses of delay tolerant network to create transient social net-
work [50]. We further assessed the privacy aspects in disaster management,
particularly when using such applications as discussed next.
4.3. Privacy in disaster management
Leaving the technical problems like connectivity and internetwork oper-
ability aside, the privacy issue in information gathering and use are minimal.
In this case, there are two possible approaches to data gathering: (i) infor-
mation is shared voluntarily by user of the device, (ii) involuntarily from
embedded device sensors. In both cases, location information and other in-
dividual details are important and may still be embedded inside the collected
data. Such information may involuntarily leak the user’s privacy as it may
provide enough information about the movement of the user. Even digi-
tal volunteers may expect anonymization of information they would share
through the first approach.
In our approach, we considered security and privacy in both mobile phone
apps and sensors based IoT systems. Sybil attack is a possible attack in a
smart phone based disaster management application [30]. The Sybil attack
is an attack wherein a reputation system is subverted by forging identities
in peer-to-peer networks. The lack of identity in such networks enables the
bots and malicious entities to simulate fake GPS report to influence social
navigation systems. The Sybil attack is more critical in a disaster situation
where people are willing to help the distressed person. The vulnerability
could be misused to compromise people’s safety. For example, the malicious
user can simulate a fake disaster alarm to motivate a good Samaritan to
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come for help in a lonely place and cause harm. The attacker can also divert
attention of rescue team from a real disaster.Using appropriate cryptography
combined with an appropriate access control model could help disseminate
information while protecting privacy in a crowdsensing application.
People try to do their best to communicate with others when they are
in a distressed situation. In this situation, one challenge is to disseminate
information while controlling the access to the information. Proper informa-
tion flow models such as Bell-LaPadula model [42, 43], Lattice model [44]
and Readers-Writers Flow Model (RWFM) [45] can be used to protect the
user’s information. Combined with proper access control mechanisms, those
information flow model can be used to guarantee that the information flow
follows the required privacy rules and does not leak any critical information
to the adversary. For example, in RWFM, the sender can control the readers
of a message by specifying their names in the readers list.
Another hard challenge in this situation is to enable end-to-end security
and privacy in processing big data streams emitted by geographically dis-
tributed mobile phones and sensors. We have investigated and proposed a
number of techniques (refer to [51, 52, 53, 54, 55] for details). Applications in
risk-critical domains such as disaster management need near-real-time stream
data processing in large-scale sensor networks. We introduced a Data Stream
Manager (DSM) to perform security verification just before stream process-
ing engine. DSM works by removing the modified data packets and supplying
only original data back to the steam processing engine for evaluation. Fur-
thermore, we proposed a Dynamic Key-Length-Based Security Framework
(DLSeF) based on a shared key derived from synchronized prime numbers;
the key is dynamically updated at short intervals to thwart potential at-
tacks [52]. DLSeF has been designed based on symmetric key cryptography
and dynamic key length to provide more efficient security verification of big
sensing data streams. Furthermore, to secure big sensing data streams we
have also proposed Selective Encryption (SEEN) method that satisfies the
desired multiple levels of confidentiality and data integrity [54].
In this way, we ensured that the data is encrypted when flowing across the
mobile ad-hoc network and when stored in a database while the read-write
flow model is used to ensure access to the data is controlled appropriately.
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5. Case Study: Citizen Privacy in Aadhaar
An entity is responsible for maintaining security of private information of
the users of its infrastructure and services. These responsibilities are broadly
defined in law as discussed earlier in Section 3, specifically in Section 3.1 in
Australian context. Governments are the entities who often need to uniquely
identify their citizens in order to efficiently and seamlessly provide necessary
services. For example, the US government issues social security number
(SSN)11 to provide and monitor social securities to its residents. The SSN
of an individual is considered as sensitive and secret. Australian government
requires individuals to obtain tax file number (TFN)12 for tax purposes,
medicare card for medical benefits and centerlink number for social services13.
An attempt of building an identity platform for the UK was dropped at the
intervention of its Parliament14.
Recently, the Government of India developed an identity platform called
Aadhaar15. Aadhaar is a biometrics based identity database and authentica-
tion system. Since today’s mobile phones and personal devices are capable of
collecting biometric information of their users, they could be used to connect
to Aadhaar to ascertain the users’ identities for crowdsensing applications in
smart cities. As such, it offers an excellent case study and shows the need for
an integrated working of technologies, processes and the law to realize the
needed privacy along with the bearers of trust.
5.1. About Aadhaar
The government of India has set up an exclusive agency called Unique
Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) to build an identity platform called
Aadhaar for people residing in India including non-citizens. Aadhaar has a
huge central database that includes demographic and biometrics information
of over 1.2 billion individuals. It has a significant amount of person centric
information including multiple biometrics such as photographs, finger prints
and images of iris from which a person can be uniquely identified. One
of the main reasons for creating Aadhaar as a huge Social Identification
11https://www.ssa.gov/ssnumber/
12https://www.ato.gov.au/Individuals/Tax-file-number/
13https://www.humanservices.gov.au/
14https://www.gov.uk/identitycards
15https://uidai.gov.in/en
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Figure 2: A top level view of Aadhaar operation ecosystem.
System (SIS) had been to prevent massive leakages and large scale fraudulent
transactions in implementation of targeted delivery of subsidies for the poor.
The government of India intends to use this platform not only to provide
and monitor the delivery of social services but also to use it as an identity
verification system for wide range of purposes. It already provides an au-
thentication service to Authentication User Agencies (AUAs) such as civil
supplies, insurance companies and banks to affirm the identities of individ-
uals based on their biometrics and Aadhaar number. A top level view of
Aadhaar operating ecosystem [56] is provided in Fig. 2.
UIDAI claims that its implementation of SIS system ensures that AUAs
cannot infringe on the user’s privacy. UIDAI dismisses any scope of mas-
sive scale surveillance as being alleged by the rights activists. In its defence,
UIDAI technology support groups reveal its technology stack having multi-
ple layers of autonomous entities. There is a Central IDentities Repository
(CIDR) which provides Identity service, enrolment packets, authentication
log, variety of meta data as well as transactional logs. Identification service
18
requests are channelised through Authentication Service Agencies (ASAs)
working as intermediary or third party verification agencies, between CIDR
and AUA. ASAs must have prior registrations in order to avail CIDR services.
Note that several apps including the ones by Government agencies have
been built on the Aadhaar platform, and are in wide use. One can gauge
the possibilities of privacy leaks and compromises on personal information
through them. Before we delve into the privacy issues with Aadhaar, let us
present the necessary background information first.
5.2. Authentication and Authorisation
In 2007, the OECD developed recommendation on electronic authenti-
cation for its member countries [57]. India has a working relationship with
OECD as a non-member country. According to the recommendation, authen-
tication is “A function for establishing the validity and assurance of a claimed
identity of a user, device or another entity in an information or communi-
cations system”. One of the principles advocated in the OECD guidelines
for authentication/authorization is, “Do not include authorisation (which is
a separate but a related process that refers to verifying the person’s or or-
ganisation’s authority to conduct specified transactions). Typically, decisions
concerning authorisation are the purview of the relying party (i.e., the entity
or person that is relying on the identity assertion to make the authorisation
decision).”
As Aadhaar has a huge central biometric database being used for au-
thentication (or identification), it is necessary to look at the issues of secu-
rity/privacy in such context.
5.3. Biometrics and Privacy
Biometrics is not secret. While biometrics such as fingerprints, iris scans
and facial images are private, they are not secrets. We leave a copy of our
fingerprints on almost everything we touch. A modern smartphone is highly
capable of taking high resolution pictures of our faces from which the iris
biometrics can be extracted. Thus, unless we spend our life wearing gloves
and shades, there is no hope that our biometrics can be kept secret. Just as
our names, our biometrics are available to the people we encounter in our
daily lives. Arguably, our names could be treated as being more secret than
our biometrics.
Technically anyone can create a database of biometrics of people in public.
However, such a possibility can be discarded for the following reasons. Firstly,
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unlike one’s name, other people have no use for one’s biometrics in normal
daily life and hence, people don’t pay attention to them. For this reason,
people may mistakenly believe that their biometrics are secret. Secondly,
although people’s biometrics is publicly available, there is no public database
from which biometrics can be freely downloaded. Such a database would be
deemed illegal in many countries.
Biometrics Matching. Biometric matching techniques gives probabilistic, and
not deterministic, answers. In other words, the biometrics scanner scores a
match on a scale of 0% to 100%. It cannot give a straightforward yes or no
answer. In Aadhaar, the UIDAI technical support group claims [41] that the
False Positive Identification Rate (FPIR) of biometrics matching is as low as
0.0025% for every 1:N searches. Also, UIDAI has the capacity to scale up to
one million enrolments per day. Therefore, in the full scale enrolment pro-
cess, just about 25 false positive matches may need to be manually judged.
At this rate, the false positives will not create major problems even if the
gallery continuously keeps on growing.
Since biometric is at most private and never a secret, using biometric for
authentication has a few issues as discussed below.
5.4. Biometrics and Authentication
The current size of the Aadhaar biometrics gallery is over 1.2 billion
records. When using biometrics together with other attributes such as Aad-
haar number or name, the chances of getting both of them matched together
are still very low at 0.0025% false positive rate. In other words, it is compara-
ble to using username and password for authentication where the username
is a unique identity and the password is associated to the username but is
secret. Now, if the biometrics alone is used, then this scenario will be sim-
ilar to using password alone for authentication/authorisation, and even the
password is not secrete as explained above. Moreover, if the authority of
authentication is given to a scanner/server connected to UIDIA, then each
biometrics scan will produce over 30,000 matches and hence this process will
fail to adequately authenticate an individual. In addition, if an individual
can obtain the Aadhaar number of any of the 30,000 other individuals whose
biometrics identities are similar to its own biometrics identities, then the
individual can flawlessly acquire the other individual’s identity and be able
to access services including social as well as financial services. Even if an
individual’s biometrics do not match with another individual’s biometrics,
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the individual can still break the authentication system by cloning the other
individual’s identity as demonstrated by BAIDU Security Lab16. Finally, the
UIDAI base automatic authentication system could potentially lead to De-
nial of Service as all the records need to be compared for each record search.
Thus, leaving authority of authentication/identity to electronic devices and
the server is at risk.
5.5. Privacy Pitfalls of Authentication
According to Schneider [58], a textbook material from a yet to be pub-
lished book on Cybersecurity by Prof. Fred Schneider, a leading security
expert from Cornell University who has championed several Cybersecurity
guidelines for US, authentication when undertaken injudiciously can lead to
privacy violations for the following reasons.
Firstly, in authenticating somebody, you learn its identity and thus, you
also learn an associated set of attributes some of which could be considered
personal information. Thus, authentication could lead to the revelation of
personal information.
Secondly, threat to privacy arises when authentication is used to validate
participants in some action. It is possible that participation is deemed private
(for instance some certain medical purchases or medical procedures); thus
the side effect of authentication is to associate personal information with an
identity. This problem is compounded when the same identifier is used to
authenticate an individual in connection to multiple actions leading to the
capabilities of third parties to be able to connect seemingly unrelated actions
with a single individual and then make inferences about associated additional
attributes of that individual.
Thirdly, in a sense, requirement of authentication implicitly institutes
a form of authorization. Thus, the prospect of undergoing authentication
inhibits people from engaging in activities they fear could be misconstrued,
deemed inappropriate, or lead to retribution. The concern here is not that
there is an erosion of basic freedoms when authentication is required but that
this erosion is inadvertent. The concern is that the policy – not side-effects of
a system’s construction – should be what dictates who may engage in what
activities, and authorization – not authentication – mechanisms should be
what implements such policy.
16http://sgcsc.sg/doc/Camp2/WS-06.pdf
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Finally, an authentication system collects and possibly stores information
for subsequent use. Note that information collected without consent should
never be allowed to be abused (that includes linking etc.).
Consequently, widespread deployment of authentication mechanisms in-
creases plausible privacy violations in three ways: (i) personal information
could be abused by the agency collecting it, (ii) stored personal information
could be stolen, and (iii) having personal information further increases the
risk of inferences by linking shared identities or other shared attributes.
5.6. Authentication Guidelines
Some of the broad guidelines that exist in the context of instituting e-
authentications including crowdsensing are [58]:
Seek Consent. The entity performing authentication should seek consent
from users about what information will be stored and what will be revealed
to the authenticating entities. In this way, people become aware that they are
relinquishing some control over the confidentiality of personal information to
that identity.
Select Minimal Identity. Authentication should be performed only against
identities that embody the smallest set of attributes needed for the task. This
reduces unnecessary exposure of privacy related attributes to the system.
Limit Storage. The information about authenticated identities should not
be saved unless there is a clear need. Moreover, the information should be
deleted once it is no longer needed. This reduces the chances that the saved
identity information can subsequently be re-targeted for uses not implied by
the consent of the user that allowed its collection.
Avoid Linking. A single, shared attribute allows linking the identities that
contain this attribute, and that could violate privacy by revealing attributes
comprising one identity to those who learn the other identity. Thus, it is
important to eschew including the same unique attribute (e.g., identifier) in
different identities.
Now, let us turn to UIDAI claims regarding Aadhaar.
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5.7. Issues of Privacy Leaks with Aadhaar
Looking at the issues of biometric databases as well the guidelines for
avoiding privacy violations discussed above, it is needless to say that prevent-
ing privacy violations in the cyberspace for the largest database of biometrics
in the world will be a grand challenge.
User Expectation. People do provide their biometrics for varieties of purposes
including visa for foreign countries. Therefore, the main question here is, Is
Aadhaar at least as safe as those systems?
Two important characteristic differences from Aadhaar operation in the
context of visa issuance are:
1. The biometric database is exclusively used for the purpose of issuance
of visa with a limited storage as highlighted above against the passport
cum visa number of the individual.
2. The authority of authentication is with the immigration officer and not
the server of the database.
Thus, one expects a trusted process that involves minimal invasion of privacy
with consent.
Insider Attacks. As highlighted already, privacy characterization is depen-
dent on the law of the land. Keeping this in mind, there has been an impor-
tant case (or a bunch of cases) currently at the Supreme Court of India for
adjudication about the UIDAI claims and the counter claims made by the
activists spearheading the assurance of privacy preserving implementation.
This will have a long-standing bearing on the interpretation of privacy law in
the context of technology. The basic premise in all above mentioned privacy
issues mainly stems from the insider attacks.
From a user perspective, the insider attack on privacy issues can be clas-
sified as:
1. Protection of privacy against registration authority.
2. Protection of privacy against access network operators.
3. Protection of privacy against attacks using a set of correlated queries
by a set colluding agencies.
In the context of the first type of insider attack, in January 2018, a
leak of Aadhaar numbers was reported by a journalist who paid just Rs 500
(equivalent to ≈ US $8) to access personal data from an enrolment centre.
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Even though this event may look insignificant, there are possible dire con-
sequences from such incidents. Specifically, the Aadhaar system has a false
positive rate of 0.0025% for a biometric match. Arguably, for each individ-
ual in the database, there are possibly 30,000 individuals whose biometrics
identities match with the individual in a database of 1.2 billion individuals.
Consequently, if one can collude with the insiders to obtain Aadhaar number
of someone else whose biometric profiles matches with one’s own biomet-
ric profile, it will be able to use the obtained identity for various purposes
including financial gains or even criminal activities.
Although, one can argue that the processes can be strengthened to avoid
such possibilities, it clearly demonstrates that a group of colluding insiders
can compromise a surveillance system and breach both privacy and security.
In the contexts of other two types of attacks, these insider attacks are
technical in nature. Particularly, the attack of type 3 appears to be techni-
cally extremely difficult. Fortunately, creating such attacks need an active
and cohesive collaboration across agencies, which is difficult to accomplish
and prone to leakage. A multi-authority strong attribute based encryption
framework [59, 60] could possibly alleviate these problems. The kernel level
support for role based decryption rights [61, 62, 63] could also enhance the
trustworthiness of data.
5.8. Security of Aadhaar
The CEO of UIDAI on 22 March 2018 presented to the Supreme Court
of India, the physical security, details of 2048 bit RSA encryption17, security
reviews conducted etc. (refer blog [65] for the technical points presented by
the CEO of Aadhaar). In biometric databases of the magnitude of Aadhaar,
it is important to ensure that long-term keys do not compromise past session
keys. It would be nice if properties such as forward secrecy (FS) are imple-
mented in Aadhaar. Forward secrecy protects past sessions against future
compromises of secret keys or passwords. A perfect forward secrecy (PFS)
assures compromises of long-term keys in the communication protocols do
not compromise past session keys. Whether this property is satisfied in the
process provided by Aadhaar [66] needs a thorough analysis.
As highlighted above, in the context of Aadhaar, the same database is
used for varieties of purposes and hence, linking of several authentications
17For an assessment of 2048 encryption, refer [64].
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exist on the same identifier. Thus, it is not easy to prove that there is no
violation of privacy. Even the claim of no storage by Aadhaar needs careful
analysis in the context of using profiles to track identities as revealed in the
infamous leakage on Facebook. The experiment done [67] shows the privacy
leakage from a wide spectrum of angles.
As per the UIDAI website, Aadhaar can be used both for identity (one
can download e-Aadhaar on one’s smartphone that will serve as an identity)
as well as for authentication. Thus, the process has to make it clear the
relationship of the biometric usage for accessing the database.
5.9. Issues in Anonymization and Virtual IDs
Recently, UIDAI has announced the use of Virtual IDs (creatable by the
user) would be used for authentication rather than the persons’ Aadhaar
number. While it appeals generally, one need to be clear about the possibil-
ities of compromise18 of ones’ Aadhaar number, virtual numbers still looks
risky (one need to answer the question whether Aadhaar number is a private
or a secret number – if it is used as an identity, certainly it cannot be a
secret number). Note that biometric access control is used in a controlled
environments like accessing server rooms, airport gates etc., and not in a
public environments as the biometric can be cloned as highlighted already.
In general, privacy concerns in crowdsensing arise from the requirements
of disclosure of personal information such as IMEI number of mobile, SIM
ID, Phone number, IP address, location, cell tracking, and other subscriber
related information. From such information, one can easily extract the home
or the office address of the person. Therefore anonymization19 of data ap-
pears to be the only way to encourage individual to share the data. However,
complete anonymization could create problem of malicious individuals shar-
ing spurious and concocted data. So, there is a need to balance between two
conflicting requirements, the anonymization and the trustworthiness of data,
18In the era of social network profiling compounded with privacy breaches like the recent
(March 2018) Facebook data breach
19Recently, Facebook Inc., admitted that data on as many as 87 million people, most
of them in the U.S., may have been improperly shared with research firm Cambridge
Analytica. The challenge is to understand, how good is the anonymization and how much
profiling can it withstand will remain a question. As in the case of authentication, it may
inhibit people sharing data (even under anonymization) and engaging in activities they
fear could be misconstrued or exploitable.
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in order to establish an effective privacy preserving crowdsensing mechanism
for surveillance/smartness.
Typically, servers managed by a trusted third party (like it is done in
authenticating credit card transactions, DNS etc.,) are made available for
gathering data through crowdsensing. Alternatively, an individual can up-
load videos or images on a specified third party server. This server removes
all traces of tracking information (e.g., personal IDs, phone numbers, GPS
data, car license numbers) before sending an event related data to the security
surveillance and control system. The server itself should be accessible only
through multiple layers of strong cryptographic frameworks. Most crowd-
sensing system incorporate reputations of participants tailored to specific
surveillance system [68, 69, 70, 71]. Incognisense [71] framework proposed
use two basic features: (i) using multiple virtual IDs with dynamic or periodic
changes, and, (ii) mapping exact reputation values to a range, where a range
is mapped to a reputation group. Mapping reputation to range and the use of
dynamic virtual ID completely masks the ID of individual participants. How-
ever, this add extra overhead in the management of crowdsensed data either
in terms of complex algorithm (for dynamic assignment of pseudo names) or
in terms of maintaining redundancy on participant information [72].
6. Conclusion
In the age of digital technologies where a personal phone is capable of
collecting, storing and transmitting personal data even without the person’s
conscious knowledge, privacy issues have become highly complicated and
extremely important. Particularly, in case of crowdsensing where an individ-
ual’s smartphone and other personal devices embedded with modern sensors
are involved in collecting and transmitting information, privacy becomes a
real issue.
In this chapter, we explored crowdsensing in smart city applications and
its privacy implications. Firstly, we presented various definitions related
to the term crowdsensing. We demonstrated that the current definition of
mobile crowdsensing that is used interchangeably with crowdsensing is not
appropriate since crowdsensing could be done by using non-mobile sensors
as well as by using people as social sensors. Secondly, we explored various
aspects of privacy, including legal definitions, obligations to crowdsensing
service providers, risks, implications and possible solutions. Thirdly, we pre-
sented two case studies relevant to crowdsensing. In the first case study,
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we demonstrated how crowdsensing can be used in disaster management.
Although the privacy concerns during a disaster event could be considered
minimal, the fact that the data collected during the disaster can remain
available long after the event is a real concern. As such, the privacy issues in
this case study are managed by using cryptography and appropriate access
control mechanisms. In the second case study, we discussed how citizen in-
formation can be collected by the governments and how the citizen’s private
data can be prone to privacy risks. We discussed the possibility that the
authorities could compromise a system to get access to people’s personal in-
formation is not unreal. In all these cases, there is no single solution that can
solve all the privacy problems in these crowdsensing applications. However,
a combination of possible solutions can be used to achieve the maximum
possible protection of the private information.
On one hand, people contributing to crowdsensing applications to make
their cities smarter need to easily and clearly understand how their private
data are going to be used. Therefore, further research is required to make the
understanding of privacy issues easier and more controllable. On the other
hand, the entities working with crowdsensing data containing people’s private
information need to have adequate knowledge of their privacy obligations,
implications, and appropriate protection mechanisms. As the attempt to use
crowdsenseing data for making smart decisions in smart cities will continue,
on going research will be required to identify and address privacy issues in
those applications.
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